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. DESERVING TO OWN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAWRENCE C. BECKER*

My project in this Article is to examine the notion that people might

"ti'ese'rve
de!len>e to own the ploductsof
pioducts of their intellectual labor in an especially
~tJr()nlg
·~t'''",.

way-stronger than any way in which they might deserve to own
.·
of non-intC,lllectual
labor,. Such a project runs counter to
non-int(.llleetual labor..
stamd;ard
rights, which discuss desertsta.nd;:ud philosophical analyses of property lights,
toi:-laloor arguments in general terms and make little or nothing of the
distinc;ticm
non-intellectual1abor" 11
dis:tin•cticm between. intellectual and non-intellectuallabor.
This Article will show that focusing on desert arguments for intellectual property raises a. disturbing issue that standard
stamdard philosophical
analyses overlook,
overlook. The issue is this: Suppose, as seems highly likely, that
there are multiple, equally powerful lines of argument that are relevant to
the justification of a syStem
o.,f private property. Utility or aggregate weiwelsystem o,f
fllIe
flue is one such line; entitlement to the fruits of one's labor is another;
and matters of fairness, liberty and personality are also standardly raised.
It would be very convenient {fall
iCall these lines of argument were congruent,
since then we would n()t
nqt have to choose among them to resolve conflicts
at the very foundations of
property theory.
theory" However, close attention to
ofproperty
desert-for-lntellectual~labor
pail' of results:
desert-for-lntellectual~labor· arguments has a disturbing pair
these arguments seem especially powerful for intellectual property, but
they yield results that seem to be a bad fit with those reached, say, by
economic or utilitarian reasoning.. 2
·.
'~
-~

L
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THE ISSUE

Imagine a world as close as can be to our own, except that questions
about intellectual property are at the moment purely philosophical .
Should we have a system ~f property lights
tights in the products of intellectual
• William R
of' Philosophy, College of
R Kenan JI',
Jr, Professor of Humanities and Professor of
Maxy. ·
u
William and Maxy.'
1,1. For a counterexample, in jurisprudentialliter'ature,
jurisprudential literature, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right
in SelfExpres,ion
YALE
SelfExpression Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law ofIntellectual Property, 102 YAlE
1. J 1533 (1993)
2"
2.. Awarning
A warning label for lawyers: IIhougb
hough I have wxitten extensively on the philosophical foundations of propeJty
property law, intellectual or otherwise
prope_rty lights in general, I am no authority on property_
The
Tlie reflections to follow are thus offered as amendments to philosophical agendas I have been pursuing,
RqbeIt Nozick, and
irig. For prompting me to embaIk
embark on this rewarding detour, II thank (belatedly) Rqbert
(less belatedly) Wendy 1.
J. Gordon, whose superb articles on intellectual property have greatly influenced my thinking
". .
U
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labor? If so, what sorts of things should it cover? And what bundles of
rights and other incidents of ownership should be included?
Given such a clean slate, several conclusions seem inescapable.. For
one, there is no reason to think, a priori, that the system of private property should not extend to ideas, patterns of thought, inventions, poems,
or music.. All the standard justifications for private property can qbviously apply to intangibles, and at least two of the standard justifications
(utility and labor-desert), if they are sound at all, cleady give prima faCie
support to treating intangible intellectual products as property,. Certainly a system of intellectual property rights can in principle have II net
positive efiect on aggregate welfare; thus, we cannot brush aside utility
arguments a priori 3 Moreover, if it is the case that people can "dese!~e"
property in the (unowned) tangible objects they improve with their labor,
then surely the case is no weaker for their deser~ing property in the intellectual o~jects they create,4
Other justifications for property may also give prima facie support
for a system of intellectual property. If, for' example, Hegel was COIll~ct
to suppose that ther'e is a necessary connection between the fiJ,ll development of individual human personality and the act ofappropriating things
(successfully) as one's "own," and if he was conect to assert that this
could be the basis for a right to property,S then it seems natural to suppose that this might be a particularly strong basis fot intellectual property.. Where, after all, could it be more important to secure the
appropriative powers of a personality than for its unique intellectual
products?6
Second, addressing the topic of intellectual property de novo elevates
to prominence an issue generally neglected in property theory in general:
are the products of "solitary and creative" labor one's "own" in a special
way that connects to justifications for private property? There is, of
3" Among the classic sources, see JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles oj the CJ'vil Code, in

THE

WORKS OF JEREMY BENIHAM 297, chs VI-IX at 304-9 (Russell & RusseJl 1962) (1843); DAVID
HUME, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles o/Morah in ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSIANDING AND CONCERNING IHE PRINCIPLES OF MORAIS 191, 192-95, app at 308-11 (p.H
Nidditch ed" 1975) (1771); JOHN StUARI MIll, PRINCIPLES OF POllIlCAI EcONOMY 199-235 (Si.
William Ashley ed, 1987) (1848)

4. Fot the classic statement of the laboI'~deseIt argument for tangible goods, see JOHN LOCKE,
Iwo 1REAIlSES OF GOVERNMENT 285-302 (pete. Laslett ed, 1988)
5 GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, TliB PHILOSOPHY .oF RIGHt (I"M" Knox, trans,

1980). And foI' a 4eveloped contemporary account of this line of'thought, see JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT ro PRIVAIE PROPERTY 343-89 (1988)..
~ Jeremy Waldron, ,supra note 5, has done the

most, among recent wIiters, to I'evive interest

in this sort of argument, But it should be noted that he is skeptical about its ability to give justifica·

tion foI' any particular SOlt of propexty Rather, he thinks it may ground a "geneIal" right to acquire
property, where, perhaps, various sorts may do,

)
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'ni:g~iII,sf:,,·#"" puzzle about the extent to which individual labor must be dissocial factors in calculating meIit? We know that intelli,:g~lce;. in,dm!tziomme;ss, health, motivation and 0ppoItunity are all CIUCial
a¢telinii~aIllts of what we produce, and are arguably not the SOItS of
!p,illgirJhat contribute to the claim that we are entitled to (or deseIve) the
produce.. Yet the thought that people do sometimes deseIve
re,wlIlrd ,(or blame) for their achievements is unshakable. s How are we to
this puzzle in the case of propeIty Iights?
Standard propeIty argUments, especially when confined to the
.
cases of tangible and fungible goods, tend to finesse the puz.',. ratheI than confront it Utility arguments focus on consequences and
pOllsu1er' aIltecedents (motives, effoIts, merit of the paIties involved) only
ihsofillr as they affect consequences.. So the facts about deseIt that matter
Ilrffrt:lerc~ly the ones related to incentives: do people believe they deseIve
"
. rights in the products of their labor? If so, what would happen
" their motives if they did not get those propeIty rights? Lockean laboI
arguments, on the other hand, do consider aIltepedents, but under du'iess9 they tend
, to retreat to the no-haIm-Iio-foul Iule.. (That is, if no one
is made worSe off by awarding propeIty rights to producers, then there
san be no reasonable o~jection to such awards.) Thus, again the puzzle
about deseIt is evaded.
But we do typically understaiid the matter of individual veIliUS social contribution to be one of degree; mpreover, we staiidardly identify
some fOIms of individual contiibution as especially "original" or creative-in the sense that they can be traced solely to all individual human
"author." The products of intellectual labor appear to be prime cases of
such solitary and originative work Focusing on intellectual labor forces
us to confront the issue of deseIt directly .
Third, a de novo discussion reveals the impoItance of a taxonomy of
candidates for intellectual propeIty.. It is striking how comparatively little philosophical labor has been devoted to making an inventory of the
types of things that might be owned In a book on "propeIty theoIY," it
is commonplace to find a whole chapter devoted to the incidents of ownership in general, and then (most of) the remainder of the book devoted
.

7'JOHN RAWLS, A 11IEORY OF JUSIICE 310-15 (1971).. FOI a useful discussion built in paI!
upon reaction to Rawls, see GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987)
_8 I have argued elsewhere that the notion of desert is -a fundamental one in moral discourse,
See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHIS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDAIIONS 45-51 (1977)
9. This is summed up nicely in what I call Proudhon's Challenge: Why should I reward you,
in the form of i:'ecognizing a tight to pl'Operty, for labor I did not ask you to perform? See PIERRE
JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAl Is PROPERlY?: AN ENQUIRY INI'O IHE. PRINCIPLE OF RIGHI AND

GOVERNMENT 84 (Benjiman R lucker trans, 1966).
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to a discussion of general justifications for private ownership of unspecified things,lO Comparatively little attention is given to the question
"Ownership of what?" There may be discussions of problem cases and
extremes (non-renewable resources, the atmosphere); seldom are there
systematic inventories, This pattern seems to be duplicated in general
discussions of intellectual property: the variety of intellectual products is
mentioned, lists are sometimes given, but then the discussion turns to
some thesis about intellectual property per se,
At the most abstract level, for property in general, this may be
harmless. But when we have moved from questions of the general justification of property per se to questions about a specific category of pmperty-a category defined by the sort of "thing" to be owned (intellectual
products)-we are well advised to pay attention to the sorts of things
included in that category. What else, if anything, beyond belonging to
the category of intellectual pmducts, do they have in common? In what
ways are they strikingly diiferent from one another? Should tlJey be
gmuped into sub-categories for the purposes of property rights ilieory?
11.

REFlEClIONS ON THE NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL ~ODUCTS

It is notorious that lists designed to serve one puipose may seem
bizarre for anotherl l The list oifer'ed in this section is framed by an
inquiry into whether intellectual products have special claim to property
rights protection in terms of desert-something that distinguishes them
from other sorts of things we Illight make. 12 In what ways are intelleCtual products different from natural Objects, or' things produced by machines, 01' by "mechanical" human labor? And in what relevant ways do
intellectual products diifer among themselves?
A,

Authorship

All human labor', insofar as it is intentional conduct, has a "mental
element" that plays a causal role in producing the labor's output. Thus,
in a uselessly broad sense, all the products of human labor-even the
wild strawberries we find and pick-are intellectual products.. For' present purposes, however, we need a nanower conception of such prod10 A M Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 147 (A G. Guest
ed, 1961).
1 L See JORGE 1 UIS BORGES, The Analytical Language of John Wilkins, in OIHER INQUlSIlIONS 1937-1952, at 101, 103 (Ruth Le Simms trans, 1964), telling a tale of an ancient taxonomy
of animals whose organizing principles elude modern understanding, (1 thank R H W Dillard fot'
promptly supplying the citation)
12 Both sheets of music and sheets of steel may have high instrumental value, so sorting prod~
ucts by degrees of instrumental value will not do,

. )
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that will include inventions and works of rut, but exclude
o~jects that we merely appropriate (wild strawbenies), or the reof happy accidents that we merely discover after the fact (the pleas. of so,me "blackened" food), or a byproduct we might expect but
not intend (an unplrumed child).. And for this task we need a nru','·C·~._.~ •.. conception of the specifically mental element involved in the labor .
. 1 suggest we confine ourselves to the sort of labor that constitutes
"'autholrship"'-'wh,ere a thing may be said to have an author' when it sattm ee conditions:
(1) its causal history is traceable to (or through)theintentional
states of an agent or agents;
(2) those agents, in the process of making their causal contribution to producing the thing, arle also creating or realizing
their mental representations of it;
(3) those representations either constitute the artifact itself (as
when the "thing" is an idea), or playa substalltial causal role in
its production..
I I
Condition 1 rules out natural o~jects; 2 and 3 rule out happy accidents
and mere physical labor. (2obblers as well as designers are authors of
h;mdmade shoes under ihis dennition Assembly line workers engaged in
the mass productioll of shoes are probably not, since whatever mental
representations they may have of the whole shoe ru'e unlikely to playa
substantial causal role. in its production.. The designers of the assembly
line, however, as well as the designers of the shoes, are authors in the
requisite sense. By definition, then, every product of intellectual labor
has at least one author MallY (like shoes) rue collaborative dforts.
B

Author-identification

Some intellectual products rue identified in part by reference to their
authors Paintings by the masters, for example, are so identified, and
most of their value (both aesthetically and monetarily) depends on this
identification l3 It matter'S whether a puzzling drawing,wIth stick
figures, was done by a four-year-old at play Or a matute artist at work;
the connection to authorship here is necessary for answering the questions "What is this?" and "What is it worth?" Other things (e . g. , mass
produced shoes) are not typically identified in this way, and no such
13, "What's that one, near the window?"
"We're not sure yet, but we should have authentication soon. It's either a Miro or a clever
imitation" If it's a Miro you can have it for $8000" If it's not, well, you can just have it. It' won't be
hanging here"

614

CHICAGO·KENT LAW REnEW

[Vol .68:609

identification is necessary for figuring out what they are, or are worth . 14
Two intermediate types of cases are worth mentioning. Sometimes
(as with a fad for a certain brand of running shoe) a certain vague notion
of authenticity matters, even though it is irrelevant to assessing the nature and value of the shoes qua shoes. And other times (as when we
legitimately appeal to an authority) knowing about the authorship of an
oQject is a reliable indirect method of determining its nature and value.
C.

Originality

We say that some intellectual labor is "creative" or "original," and
some is not. The expression is ambiguous.. It can mean that the laborproduct is the first of its kind . ls But more commonly (as here) it means
simply that the product originates in the agent's labor-that its causal
explanation is in some important sense traceable to the agent but not
beyond
It is notoriously difficult to define the difference even in paraI
digm
cases, let alone borderline ones, but perhaps this will suffice for
! ;
, "
present purposes:
Non-original labor. The paradigm case of non-creative intellectu~l
labor is one in which that labor is merely an intermediate link in a transitive causal chain that begins outside the agent. 16 The "source" of the
product lies elsewhere; the agent merely replicates or (dis)assembles
something in order to make it. (Think of pure copyists, say of medie~al
manuscripts.. Their intellectual labor is not creative, but it is productive.)
Original labor. The paradigm case of originality-of creative jnte!lectuallabor-on the other hand, is one in which the transitivity (if any)
of prior causes fails to extend to the labor. The labor is the source, the
beginning, of (a part of) the causal account of the product. l7 (Think of
trying to give a complete, transitive causal account of the composition' of
Mozart's Don Giovanni that makes Mozart himself simply an intermedi~
ate link. Every note, voicing, key change, or tempo would have to oe
explained by events "outside" Mozart. We certainly cannot give such an
explanation, and we commonly think none exists-while we can find evi14" It is pointless to collapse this distinction by incorporating into the descdption of every
authored object an account of what making the object "meant" to its author (e,g". the first shoes
,
made after the strike of '75)
15 See infra patt II F
16 Thus, imagine a chain of causes and effects (A causes B, and B causes C, and C causes D)
such that tIansitivity holds That is, imagine that it is true foI' the chain that "If A causes 'B, and B
causes C. and C causes D, then A causes D," Now if the intellectual labor is one of the intermediate
links (B or C). it is not "creative,,"
17, WhetheI' causation~without~transitivity is a fully intelligible notion is a nice metaphysical
question., Clearly. deterministic explanatoIY projects in behavioral science assume that human ~
havior is all fully explicable (in principle). and hence the end~point of transitive causal chain~
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!~~:4~hce of influences, tendencies, exigencies outside the composer that are

'l','J:)l1t~of a full explanation, anotheI substantial part simply begins with
;;L~~ozart's creative activity.) . In that sense the worker's product has
J;;i>!iginality
:;":.This obviously has implications foj: propeIty lights.. If iny labor is
Y'§iPtplyan inteImediate link in a transitive causal chain, then I have no
;'spedai claim to its product-·no claim at all, pel·haps, since the causal
~xpIanation can drop all reference to inteImediate points and still be ac<S4i:ate. This point tends to be obscured by general discussions of deselt·:foHabor arguments, and to make them look as strong across. the board
a$ they are for intellectual products.

D.

Scarcity
. ,

. . ..

~

The "mental element" of intellectual prQducts adds some peculiaIito the notion of scarcity.. Poems, compositions, mathematical proofs,
. philosophical arguments can be pioducedan.d reproduced without ~y
. Iqss of oIiginality. Not so for the physical manuscIipts: T. E. Lawrence
1:laimed to have more 01' less reproduced the text of The Seven Pillars of
. Msdom after the only manuscIipt had been lost in Reading Station 18
'The book we have is arguably the same as the one that was lost, but the
inanuscIipt from which it was published is not the lost one.
Moreover, "the same" mental element can have several independent
authors with an eqJlal claim to oIiginaliiy . 19 Independent discoveIies are
a common enough occurrence in the natural sciences and mathematics to
secure the point.. And. the same SOlt of multiplication of oIiginais is pos.
sible for any intellectual labor. (The contingent fact that, though it is
logically possible, this SOlt of independent cIeation does not happen for,
say, symphonies and novels is interesting, and a source of some hilarity:
recall the character in a Borges stolY who is devoting his life to wIiting
Don Quixote from scratch, word for word, unassisted by Cervantes'
text. 20)

fies

18 I E LAWRENCE, SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM, A IRIUMPH 21-23 (1935)
19 I am indebted to Charlotte Becke. for suggesting that multiple oxiginal authorship, as I will
call it, should have a prominent place in the analysis of deserving to have intellectual propeIty.
20. JOI>,GE lUIS BORGES, Pierre Menard. Author a/the Quixote, in LABYRINIHS 36-44 (1962)
Ihis will give the essence of the project, After giving a list of 'Menard's published work, the nauatoI
says:
,
I tum now to his other work: the subteIt'anean, the interminably heroic, the peerless "
Ihis work, perhaps the most significant of our time, consists of the ninth and thirty-eighth
chapters of the first patt of Don Quixote and a fragment of chapter twenty-two

..

[Menru:d] did not want to compose another QUixote-which is easy-but the Quixote
itself. Needless to say, he never contemplated a mechanical transcription of the original; he
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The fact that the same intellectual product can have multiple authors has some interesting corollaries The mental element in a given
intellectual product can be possessed by an unlimited number of people,
if it can be "known" by them in sufficient detail Moreover, if it is known
by anyone who can communicate it adequately to others who can in tum
communicate it, then "natUIal" scarcity is not likely to be a long-lasting
problem.. Aside from the limits of the power to communicate, scarcity
will be a function of artifice: withholding or restricting communication
The implications for property theory are rather startling (though
certainly familiar enough in intellectual property law).. They show how
much can be missed by not paying special attention to intellectual property.. In general (philosophical) treatises on property, propositions about
scarcity are introduced as part of the rationale for property rights., The
thought is that we need such rights in order to manage the distribution of
scarce resources efficiently, or fairly, Where r'esources are perfectly
abundant (e.,g" breathable air), there is no need for ownership
arrangements,
In the realm of intellectual property, however, it is clear that the
tables are tUIned., Once created, intellectual products that are not necessarily author-identified can be replicated. In many cases (e"g." simple
melodies or' ideas) the cost of r'eplication is negligible; scarcity could be
eliminated Property rights are introduced to sustain scarcity for the
benefit of the owners, or perhaps (by providing incentives to others) for
the long-run aggregate welfare. Thus, it is scarcity-by-artifice that n,eeds
justificlltion, if property rights are to be justified.. That is not a task that
philosophers have often addressed

E.

Singularity

The safety pin is an elegantly simple and useful device, but its design
(even a plan for its mass production) does not seem beyond the reach of
did not propose to copy it His admiIable intention was to produce a few pages which
would coincide-word for word and line foX' line-with those of Miguel de Cervantes
The first method he conceived was relatively simple, Know Spanish well, recover the
Catholic faith, fight ~gainst the Moors or the TUlk, forget the histOIY of Europe between
1602 and 1918, be Miguel de Cervantes. Pierre Menard studied this procedure '.' put
discarded it as too easy. Rather as impossible! my reader-will say . Granted. bufthe undertaking was impossible from the very beginning and of all the impossible ways of canying it out, this was the least interesting. To be, i~ the twentieth century, a popular novelist
of the seventeenth seemed to [Menard] a diminution, To be, in some way~ Celvantes and
reach the Quixote seemed less arduous to him-and, consequently, less interesting-than
to go on being Pierre Menard and reach the Quixote through the expedences of' Pierre
Menard
Id at 39-40

""

!?1t;<
_~Ji;>

/;t'iJ2?3]::::
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~8:ig.idillarY intelligence. It is easy to imagine that it might have had hun~tXatM~;' ~ven thousands of oIiginating authors before it became ubiquitous"
~t;~Iii~~#hgs, catches, and pins are well known,. a spling-catch-pin in which
~)ft~¥point of the pin is covered by the catch is not a great intellectual leap"

t;~;iUdi>e$ hot lise to the level of non-obviousness,,21 Most intellectual labor,
Ki~~i~~J~~a.uthored and OIiginai 01' not, is of this SOIt. However valuable it
:QJi!lllb.~be (in refolming the political PI'Ocess, developing a new medical
;,i;Ji~twent, selling wallpaper .. .,), it does not spling fI'Om a "singular"
,;i~feIlectuai effolt.
By contrast, other intellectual products seem to be utterly singular"
;There seem to be two SOItS:
; , (I) One OCCUIS when the work is not only beyond the reach of
ordinary intelligence, but inexplicable even in telms of ex. traordinalY intelligence and effolt. 22 Such works ale not ex-,
plained but simply categolized as works of genius or
. inspiration.
(2) The other SOIt OCCUIS when
(a) the work is defined in telms of its fine stlucture (notefor-note, word-for-word stluctuI'e) IatheI' than its coarse StIUCture (themes, plot-line, general effects), and
(b) the fine stlucture is either exceedingly intIicate or singular' in sense (I), 23
What is preposterous about multiple original authorship for Don
Quixote is that the work is Singular in sense (2), Multiple original authorship of the cold-war containment strategy is not prepostelous at all.
That work is defined in broad telms that one can imagine orlginating
independently with many deep strategic thinkers; it is not defined in
telms of George Kennan's actual ~oIds.
This creates a ploblem of enOlmous subtlety for intellectual propelty theolY: Which intellectual products should be defined in telms of
their fine stlucture? How fine is fine? How coarse is coarse? Economic

:pr·:

21.. FoI' an explication of the doctrine of non-obviousness as a term of art in the law of patents,
see Graham v. John Deere Co, 383 US 1 (1966) (l thank my colleague 'Irotter Hardy fox this

reference.)
22" The mathematician Mark Kac has said that "there are two kinds of geniuses, the ordin31Y
and the magicians, An ordinaxy genius is a fellow that you and I would be just as gOod as, if we were
only many times better." But for the second kind, "even after we understand what they have done,
the process by which they have done it is completely dark
,. Alan lightman, The One and
Only. 39 NY REV. BOOKS 34-37 (Dec. 17, 1992) (quoted in a review of JAMES GIEICK, GENIUS:
THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF RICHARD FEYNMAN (1992».

23. For Lea:med Hand's discussion of this issue, see Nichols v" Universal Pictures Corp. , 45
F 2d 119, 121 (2d Ci. 1930), eert. denied, 282 U S. 902 (1931).. (I thank my colleague Trotter Haxdy
for this reference)
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arguments for managing scarcity give answers, in the sense that the fine/
coarse choice correlates rather directly to how effectively property rights
can influence scarcity. (If my rights are only to the fine structure of my
compositions, I can have no claim against people who perform my
marches in 3/4 time, composers who quote my melodies but orchestrate
them differently, etc. Property rights like that do little to create scarcity.
If, however', my rights are to the coarse structure of my compositionssay, to any variation on its motifS-then they are very powerful indeed,)
But what we need to know is what licenses a given level of scarcity . Desert-for-labor arguments give some guidance on this question, as we will
see below,

F,

(Temporal) Primacy

Being the first (the oldest known) instance of a given intellectual
product is sometimes given unjustified weight, Either later instances
were derived from older ones or not, If they were, then credit fororiginality belongs only with the oldest If later instances were independent,
however, then credit for original~ty goes to them as welL Temporal primacy should not be confused with originality.
Sometimes, however, the antiquity of a thing revises our estimate of
its singularity. Suppose the history of the safety pin turns out to be
something like this: First, someone invented it whole, meaning that the
first known safety pin is also the first known pin, wire, spring, and catch
This invention was then lost for a time, during which the components
were independently invented for other purposes (say, clocks). And at
last, the safety pin was invented again fI'om the components., We might
in that case be willing to call the first invention (but not the second one) a
singular occurrence,
In either case, however, temporal primacy alone seems a red herring.. Originality and singulatity are the relevant issues.
III..

A,

DESERT

Social practices 24

Ethnography demonstrates that a strong, possessory disposition of
some sort is a very general feature of human personality across a wide
range of cultures, This disposition is everywhere channeled through so~
cial norms that help to create, sustain, and restrict it-usually by ar24.. Ibis section brutally condenses mateIial I explored at length in Lawrence C. Beckel, The
Moral Basis of Property Rights, in PROPERlY; NOMOS XXII 187·220 (J Roland Pennock & John W
Chapman eds. 1980) References to the social scientific litexature may be found there,
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iiligrelIilell't~

equivalent to what we would call (limited) private property
Private property rights may well be universal;26 they are cernot tied to economically developed societies,27
There is wide vaIiety, however, both within aIld across cultures,
the specific possessory "interests" people have aIld the pdority

~~~~~~1r?il,~:~.;~,~!'~': aI'e given. ,Here property dghts do seem to minor eco-

!.t'

organization to some extent, The rights to traIlsfer, transmit,
consume, or destroy aI'e necessaIily included in ownership of a
array of things in capitalist'economies, fOr' example., By contrast, in
;.",e,Ce",':::, Age economies, feudal systems, and socialist ammgements, the
::~;,.':"i+~ht to the capital" is frequently restricted, as is inheritance,28 (Think
V~W~ restrictions on transfer aIld transmittal of real property under
fe\i',dali.sm"" 29)
, : ,.'"
In all this variety,.there is at least one constaIlt that is especially
:, r~levant here: the special strength of possessory claims to "personal"
," tpings-where that means either things created by one's own effort out of
one's own (or unowned) materials, and/or things held for personal use,
especially when they are '~identified'; with (among tpe distinguishing
marks ot) the person.. This is so even in cultures. with. stringent redistrib~
utive rules (the RomaIl paterfamilias; so-called primitive "commllnism").,
Of course it does not follow, from the fact that such. possessory interests exist, that they ought to be recognized as morally compeiling, or
be protected by law"" But a general, sustained social practice, robust
enough to be cross-culturally important, puts the burden of proof on anyone who wishes to ignore its normative importance., Let us say, then,
that there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of social norms that sup25, By limited I mean less-than-the-full-set of the incidents of full "liberal" ownership desClibed by Honore, supra note 10.. Honore lists th~ eleven incidents: tights to possess, to use, to
manage, to derive" income from, to get at the "capital" (to alienate, "mOdify or' consume it), to tI'ans·
mit by will 01 bequest, to have "security" (immunity from expropriation), combined -with the absence of term, the prohibition of hatmful use, liability to execution for debt, and rules governing
residuals
26.. Ihis generalization excludes small-scale ~'intentio~al" communities, religious and secular~
Even there, however, one usually findS that people are entitled to significant forms of personal
property
27" Nineteenth century debates about primitive communism operated with lather ru.1·oI'-noth~
ing concepts of ownership and law A South Sea Islander in a coastal tribe, for example;' might not
likely have full liberal ownership of what 'he id~mtifi.ed as "his" canoe, in the sense that he was
forbiqden to destroy it, or to deny its use to others when he himself could not take it out to fish ,But
using Honore'S analysis, it is easy to find modern analogs of such rest'iicted ownership, e g , in the
law of ousts
28 See Becker, supra note 24,
29. See I"HOMAS E BERGIN & P'AUI O. HASKEll, PREFACE ro EsIAIES IN LAND AND Fu<

lURE INTERESI. (1966).
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port possessory interests in "personal" things-however that class may
be culturally defined,
B_

Deserving to own

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that some of the products of intellectual labor are paradigm cases of "personal" things" Original authorship, for example, when I!JlY raw materials involved are either one's
own or unowned, is one such case And when a product is author-identified, it can certainly become a part of the author's distinguishing marks
as a person, Singular products are especially likely to be authoridentified,
Even if there is a rebuttable presumption in favor of norms that support possessory interests in such personal things, we still need argumentes) to show whether such norms should amount to a system of
property rights" And we need argument(s) to show what incidents of Ii
system of property rights properly attach to various intellectual products,
Economic arguments, and mon': generally, arguments about aggregate utility, are attractive here because they promise to give guidance on
the details, We can use such arguments to address property rights questions at any level of specificity: whether in general some sort of system of
private property is likely to be a good idea; whether certain species of
private ownership rights (say use and consumption) of a certain species
of thing (say liver water) would be justifiable under certain conditions;
whether Jones in particular ought to have the right to use the portion of
the Platte River that runs through his farm in any way he wants (damming, dumping, taking water for irrigation" ,),' Not every classic argu~ "
ment for private property has this sort of applicability "all the way
down,,"3o
The notion that laborers deserve a fitting and proportional return for
their work is an ancient one,31 however, and it too promises to be applicable all the way down" (There may be a general connection between
desert and property rights; there may be a special connection between
desert and certain forms of property rights; and jf such arguments work"
at all, at any level, they will have to apply to particular people inparticu.::
lar cases . ) Moreover, in our culture the labor-desert idea is now viItually
irrepressible" It informs one strand of Locke's famous labor theoryofcl,
(the original acquisition of) property rights"n And jf such an argument
30, See BECKER, supra note 8, at ch 3
31 "[F]or the labourer is worthy of his hire,," Luke 10:7.
32 LocKE, supra note 4, reformulated in BECKER" supra note 8, at 53~56.
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the products of intellectual labor, it will cOnstrain utility

~~;(i~~~~~~;~ at evelY level of specificity, It thus needs to be given in~

sClutiny)3
own something is to have one or mOle of the following lights to
(along with other incidents of ownership, such as absence of
'~"",,'" to possess, to manage, to use, to delive income from, to
~ri,~nil~~~~~~'.;'; sale 01' gift, to modify, to destmy 0I' consume, to tl'ansmit by
have such lights is to be entitled to exclude othels in some
\'Yay(s). flom. the thing. If I am entitled to exclude you,I have the power
:~"",~,,~~, your libelties and duties with r~spect to the thing, That is, when
•. • my entitlement to possess or' iD.ana:gethe thing, you lose the
"'---'.. '. do so, and you acquire various duties with respect to me (reirniin" the thing to me, not tresPflSsing, etc,).,
UIlO;}eI' what conditions can l deserve to have such powers over you
. ojmylabor?3S Thatquestion is equivalent to asking under what
qOI}ditlOllS my labor can justify your becoming liable, or vulnerable, to
. ,..:, ..... !IlY manipulation of your libelties and duties". What SOlt of labor could
ctpthat? There seem to be three possibilities: 1) that propelty-Iights-fori~~or isa justifiable public lesponse to special excellence; 2)that it is a
justifiable reciprocal exchange; 3) that it is a justifiable public response to
special human needs 36
.
'.
.
,
.. '

"

1"

Excellence
'<',

Suppose we argue as follows:
(a) Some intellectual labor exemplifies human excellence.
It exceeds ordinary human achievement&'-perhaps by being exceedingly original, 01 difficult, or brave, or beautiful,
(b) Some human excellence is wOlthy of admiration,37
Beyond being morally pelmissible, it is especially valuable or
well-motivated, for example, and presents a model we should
emulate,
(c) If something is wOlthy of admiration, we should admire it. That is, our reaction should not be indifference or envy
33 Ihe following pruagraphs on deseIt extensively rewoIk BECKER.. supra note 8, at 49-56"
34 Using a revised version of' Honore, ,supra note 10, I onCe calculated (not altogether sexi-

ously) that there were 4,080 logically possible vatieties of ownership" See Becker, ,supra note 24. at
216 n,12,
35, I leave aside (as quaint) issues of whethet' status can justify such powers-that is, whether
they rightly acclue to people who have certain talents. or who are especially beautiful, bxave, intelligent, or moral. The deseIt-for-excellence argument, however, comes peIilously close to being quaint
36. See GOIdon, ,upra note 1
37, Only some Think of an excellent tolturer
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or malice or (merely) disappointment in ourselves, Rathel', if
we are emulating human excellence as we should, we will give
things what they are due; in this case we will admire whatever
is worthy of admiration
(d) If we should admixe some piece of intellectual labor,
then, absent countervailing evidence,38 we should express our
admiration to the laborer(s)., Such expressions help sustain the
people we admire; and if we are emulating human excellence as
we should, we will try to sustain admix'able people., (As we say,
they deserve it.)
(e) If a piece of intellectual labor has general public significance, then an expression of admiration from the public
through its social institutions, a public expression, is appropriate, absent countervailing evidence.
(t) If giving people property lights in the products of their
admirable intellectual labor helps to sustain them as admirable
people,39 then, absent countervailing evidence, it is an appropriate public expression of admiration. It will be something they
deserve
Now suppose that such an argument is sound It thus supports the general proposition that (under vaguely specified conditions) it is appropriate to award unspecified sorts of property rights to people whose
excellent labor warrants it But how strong is that support? Does It entail anything about what sorts of property lights intellectual labor might
justify? The answers are that it provides only equivocal suppoxt, and that
support is limited to a curious form of non-preclusive property rights.,
Alternatives, The argument from excellence gives only equivocal
support because there are plausible alternatives to property rights as a
public expression of admiration., The British have their "Honours List;"
we have Medals of Freedom, the Kennedy Center .Honors, and so forth,
In short, there are many ways in which we can make public expressions
of admiration,and it is not easy to see why a resort to property rights
would ever be necessary, as opposed to merely appropriate, 011 this desert-basis alone., We can, for example, publicly express admiration by
e!lsuring author-identification: intellectual products can be named for
38 'Ihat is, a'bsent evidence to the effect that such expression w.ould be a :~et. h~rm -to t~e
in c~ wb:ere it would be tactless or ,emban-assing to the people involved to-"~ak~ ai)
i$sue" of' it.
' .
39 Whether awarding property rights actually helps to sustain admirable intellectua1labor is a
rC?Cipient~

vexi~g

empiIicaJ issue, In this it is like the question of incentives faced by economic at'guments,
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:ii.iIlVe~t()r'S, and the author-identification can be kept alive by conven,il\twithotlt· tesorting to property rights,.
q!;:(jlii·sh\)i:t; as long as there are altematives to property rights, the arliiiji~itiriilolIl' excellence will give only equivocal support to them. That
m~:lUils;o:thei'" lines of argumellt (e . g." economic ones) will have the decisivc;NioiCc~"albotlt whether property rights are appropriate.. It does not
lio'we,rer", that such arguments will have the decisive voice in what

:qf!~~~f~~(.~t:1:Y rights are approptiate., To wit:
i~;

of non-preclusion. If the desert-for-excellence argument
s"t,ril'Veauiivocal support for property rights in a given sort of case,
'eqiaivoc~ltioill is resolved (say, by utility) in favor of awarding
will just any SOlt of property rights be suitable? No,.
arrangements will often have to be of a c.urious form, Since
original authors are often possible for intellectual products,
. arrangements congIUent with desert will have to be able to ac.:Cliriii!iodal[e unanticipated discoveries about who deserves ownership .
pri)dUlctS
are defined very narrowly (in terms of their fine StIUC,
will rarely be a problem. But what about people who imagine,
electronic devices well enough to get a patent, but write their
ii,i''; " .._,,~ into novels or movies instead? If the devices are then independently
iriv'enlted and patented by other'S, and if we have resolved the equivocain desert-for-excellence arguments by saying excellence will be rewarded with property rights, then surely both have a desert-claim to title,
Thlls; these intellectual property rights would be vulnerable to revision to
.,". joint ownership arrangements whenever another original author is found .
. Surely it would be odd to accept a desert basis for one person that precluded other equally deserving people from getting a similar reward. We
will find that the same limitation is imposed by other versions of the
desert argument..
2

Reciprocal benefits

A second sort of desert-for-Iabor argument is based on the value of
the product, not the excellence of the producer's activity.. This is a version of Locke's labor theory of property, rooted in the notion that (under
some conditions) laborers are entitled to property rights in the value they
create through their work. But this is a notoriously difficult idea. Property rights are rights in rem-rights against the world Awarding them
to one person involves imposing at least liabilities on the rest of us Proudhon's challenge to this notion is captured by a rhetorical question: Why
should we pay you (in the form of property rights) for "value" we did not
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ask you to create?40
Proudhon's challenge can be met, but only if· the desert-for-value
argument is highly qualified.. Think first about the sorts of labor that will
not meet the challenge:
(a) If your labor produces a net loss for others, it does not on
that account support imposing afurther loss on them-in the
form of the liabilities entailed by awarding you property rights .
Insults do not justify the addition of injuries.
(b) If your labor produces neither a loss nora benefit for
others, it likewise gives no grounds for their reciprocation in
the form of awarding property rights.. Why should we impose a
general liability on the public as a reciprocal response to labor
that produces nothing of general significance?
(c) If your labor does produce a net benefit for others, then it
m~y call for a reciprocal benefit from the public (see below),
but only if making the reciprocal return does not itself replace
the benefit with a loss.. (If it does, then we are back to (a)
above.)
(d) And there is a further wrinkle: Suppose your labor ",as
mandated? Suppose you were bound by antecede~t obligations
to produce these benefits, and you produced no more than required? Surely that is the end of a reciprocal exchange, not the
beginning of a new one.
(e) We should probably note explicitly, as well, that the labot·
involved here must be morally!1egally permissible. Malice does
not deserve a reward, even if it produces accidental benefits.
(1) And we should note that reciprocity is based on the notion
of making a return that is "fitting and proportionaL" That notion is double-edged: benefits deserve proportional benefits in
return; burdens deserve burdens.
Thus, a desert-for"labor argument based on public reciprocation for
value produced begins with this highly qualified principle:
A person who produces a public benefit,41 by way of mOrlilly
permissible (but not required) actions, deserves to receive a fitting and proportional benefit from the public for doing so. Similarly, if a person's unrequired actions produce Ii public burden,
40" See PROUDHON, supra note 9
41 This need not be directly a public good in the technical sense (i.e., of a non-partitionable
good, equally available to everyone).. It may instead be a good (like a piece ofliction) that is offered
indiscriminately to the public and is enjoyed by a few thousand Or it may be a privately held good
(like a painting) that is • product of activity that contributes to the general welfare
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,<tfi"t"'''',qon c1eserves to bear a fitting and proportional burden
:F,,,~~<., lUigtle:d

at length in Reciprocity,42 what counts as a "fitting"
should be determined by what constitutes a genuine
""".:n"'1;l'lll'l:1eIl) for the one receiving it, (I have not reciprocated prop~;~,~~~;jtg!e!~c:iotls meal when I have offered in retum food that is relig§}Y,:,9:fm9,rlllly offensive to
benefactor" A fitting retum must be
my benefactor can accept as good.) And what counts as
r~~pi6t'grj:!()r,<a<11':< retum is limited by an equal sl:lcrifice principle: the sac~;;~~~m~«~in: satisfying your desert-claim, should not exceed your
DJ
producing (our part of) the good<, (Suppose a middleftF:J;<f~~i~~:~Ult,<with little sacrifice, gives a child abicycle-one that is of
II~~«< penefit to the child<, Does the child have to reciprocate with
of enormous benefit to the adult? <A luxury cal', for example?
It proportionality were tied to the size of the benefit to the
it would be an instrum~nt of oppression.)
the desert-for-value principle to justify property rights, then,
to show that an agent gratuitously and permissibly produced a
£(:l:l~tpul,lic benefit, and that property rights are the most fitting and pro:)i'",nrtinn~ 1 retum for that benefit. Can We do this in the case of the prod>n"T~'()f intellectual labor? The answer is again equivocal, and limited by
«< mm-preclusion principle<,
Alternatives. Laborers determine wh.at counts as a fitting reward for
value they have createa: we must reciprocate with things they, not
we, regard as good" Whether the award of a given sort of property rights
is the only possible award that isfltting, then, is not quite the open question heI'e that it was for the desert-for-excellence argument. A sincere
insistence, on the part of the laborer, that only full ownership lights will
do is a prima facie reason for concluding that there <are no fitting
altematives.
Leaving it at that is unsatisfactory, of course, for two closely related
reasons, One is that a laborer' can be ignorant (or dismissive) of altematives which she would have preferred, had she but considered them
fairly" Thus, it makes sense to insist on a full information standard here,
The I'esUlt is a hypothetical account of fittingness: X is fitting If it is what
laborers would prefer if they fully appreciated all the options«
The other closely related issue is proportionality<, What counts as
appropriate reciprocation is determined not only by fit but by proportion,
and proportionality is determined by what counts as equal sacrifice, We

my

~

42«

LAWRENCE C BECKER, RECIPROCIIY ch< 3 (1986)<
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must not be obligated to reciprocate in a way that represents a greater
sacrifice than that made by the laborer.. Thus, if the fittingness conditions set by the laborer entail a disproportionate sacrifice, reciprocation
.
cannot be made..
Given these limitations on the fittingness condition, the desert"forvalue argument will only support the award of property rights unequivocally if (i) property rights are the only alternative a fully informed laborer would accept as fitting, and (ii) such an award is not a
disproportionate sacrifice for others. In other cases its support for property rights will either be equivocal (because there are alternatives to
pI'Operty rights that count as appropriate recipI'Ocation), or it will be
stalled by the conflict between fittingness and proportionality.4:l
Non-preclusion.. Fittingness and proportionality entail yet another
important limit on the award of intellectual property rights: if reCiprocity
requires such awards in one case, it will require them in all similar' cases.
And whenever multiple original authorship is possible, the rights
awarded will have to remain vulnerable to revision to joint ownership
arrangements whenever another original author is found,
1.

Need as the basis for desert

A third version of the desert-for-Iabor argument has to do with the
way in which the laborer can come to have special needs that can appropriately be met by the award of property rights.. Suppose we argue a$
follows:
.
(a) Laborers sometimes become dependent on their products in
a way connected to their identity as persons, so that the welfar'e
of the product is related directly to their (psychologiciil) integrity or welfare as persons . 44 Let us call this relation identitydependence.
43 We can, of course, finesse the impasse by constIUcting a "reasonability" standrud that in~
eludes not only a full information condition but also requires the ~1tetnatives to be limited to "t'ea,..
sonable" ones-that is, ODes that do not demand disproportionate sacrifice,
44" Many metaphors allude to such dependence. We say that people intemalize, incorporate,
01 become peI'sonally invested in things; that a thing can beeo'roe an extension of one's peI'Sonaliw;
that one can project oneself into a thing.. FoX' the purposes of this axgument, such metapho~s ru:e not
necessary All that this and subsequent premises require is (a) the commonsense observ'!ltion that a
person's pSYChological well-being can be causally· linked to the well~being of a "thing" in ·such a way
that the thing's faring well contributes positively (and its filting badly contdbutes negatively)tQ the
person's well-being, (b) the obvious fact that such things may.be the products of the person's intellectual1abor, and (c) the obvious fact that the linkage may be (psychologically) profound-such that
when the object fares badly, the person's very sense of self~ self-wotth, or ''wholeness'' may be diminished. FOI an illuminating account of ~uch dependence, see John Seabrook, The Flash 0/ G~njus,
THE NEW YORKER, Jan 11, 1993, 38-52. It is an account of Robelt Keams's effOlt to establish
tights to his invention of the intelmittent windshield wiper
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Idcmtiity-deJpellldelnce on the products of one's labor consti.halVilllg a basic peIsonal need for the welfare of those

basicpeIsonal n.eed is generated and sustained by social
;(,r(;;'hJ:i'iii)s# and if one's meeting that peIsonal need requires the
. ""'"'''' bfad<lltional social nOIms, then either i) the help should be
"i,.i,·.!'': , gJI V~'''i or ii) the need-sustaining nOIms should be changed"
Idc;ntiity-deJpellldelnce on the products of one's intellectual
. is generated and sustained by social nOIms that identify
.
' excellence with authoIship, oIiginality, and singularity,
. ,.• which encourage the author-identification of products"
Ownership nouns sometimes help meet the basic peIsonal
of identity~dependence on the products of one's intelleclabor.
most contestable step in the argument is probably (c). I cannot
thc'I'Ollgh-goinJl; philosophical defense of it heIe, but perhaps that
Step (c) is, after all, only the extension of the familiar
;/i~gavimc'ral pIinciple that the one who creates the unjustifiable peIil has
a:iipec~ial duty of cale to the people put at Iisk. The idea here is simply
the veIY social nOIms that cIeate the incentive for productive intel.Iec:tuld labor may also ulljustifiably impelil those laborers, The peIil is
, laborers may become identity-dependent on the products of their
labor and thereafter be unable, by themselves, to preseIve their (psychological) integIity as persons. When that is so (and is due to social nOIms
identifying human excellence with authoIship, oIiginality, and singularity, and encouIaging the author-identification of products), an ameliorative soeiai response is in order, Producers deseIve that much.
Now suppose that such an argument is sound, It thus SUppOItS the
genel'al proposition that it may sometimes be appropriate to award unspecified SOItS of propeIty lights to laborers whose special need wanants
it. But as with the other versions of deseIt-for-labor arguments, we must
ask how strong that SUppOIt is. Does it entail anything about what SOIts
of propeIty lightsintellectuallabor might justify? And the answers, once
again, are that it provides only equivocal SUppOIt (if there are altemative
ways of meeting the need), and that SUppOIt is limited to non-preclusive
fOIms of propeIty lightS (since there may be multiple, equally needy
authors).
Notice fUIther that, although in this version of deselt-for-Iabor need
t;'\'Tf' ..

45. NOlrns othel than those for imposing justifiable burdens (e g, those for assigning blame,

administering punishment, enforcing fair play and recipt'Ocity)
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is the ostensible basis for deserving to own, the argument is not available
to anyone who may develop such a need, Premises (c) and (d) do a good
deal of the heavy lifting, and effectively restrict its .use to laborers whose
need for propeIty tights was in large part geIl.eIated by social norms
which function to create such needs quite geIl.er'ally" Idiosyncratic or
pathological needs are thus not going to get this argumeIl.t going.,
There remains, however, a troublesome question about subjectivity.
It looks as though the profundity of the need, and whether only the
award of propeIty rights will meet it, will be highly vaIiable individual
matteIs even among deseIving laborers. If so, theIl. laboreIs who are Idatively tough-minded, psychologically
secure, and' dispassionate'
about
or
.
.
•
L
detached from their products are at a disadvantage., They simply will not
"n~d" property Iights, whereas tender-minded, insecure, ,possessive people with passionate attachments to their labor-products will have the requisite need
. .
As fllI as I can tell, the only fair response to that wony is simply to
concede that such variance will exist, Some laborers just will not be able
to avail themselves of the ne~ argument. But that is not really SUIpriSing., After all, not eveIyone who needs propeIty in this sense will deseIve
it on the basis of exceJleIl.ce or reciprocity, either .Some individual cases
will be suppoIted by all three versions of the desert aIgumeIl.t; otheIs by
only one or two,

IV.,

RESUL IS AND REMAINDERS

Suppose these deselt-for-Iabor arguments ar'e sound, and that we
can establish, in particular cases, whether or not they "SUppOIt" the
award of propelty rights., What follows flom this for jurispIUdeIl.ce? Let
me merely outline, rather than argue fOI, a multi-palt answer,
(1) Nothing about what ploperty law ought to be follows immediate(y from the desert arguments.. There are many other
relevaIl.t factoIs to consider', notably aggregate welfare, Rational policy recommeIl.dations have t6 be based on all the relevant considerations .
(2) If the deselt arguments aIe not factored into the final policy, however (whether it is for or against the award of propeIty
rights), theIl. we will have abandoned impoItant elements of
fairness and justice in this corner· of the legal system, '
(3) It is hard to see how thedeselt aIgumentS could be factored
into the award of propeIty rights without honoring thenon"
preclusion pIinciple"

Dl!SERVlNG TO OWN INTELLEC1UAL PROPER1Y

629

.)j;(iI)]fIql~(jring

the nqn-preclusi'On principle w'Ouid introduce sigint'O intellectual pr'Operty law. F'Or example,
being excluded fr'Om rewards f'Or their w'Ork, auth'Ors
.""". sh'Ow their il!tellectual independence from patented
w'Ould be' entitled t'O share the pr'Operty lights in

Fi;n@c::~t>chlanl~es
WU.v

, that at least tw'O maj'Or' tasks remain virtually unt'Ouched in
.
. We need a careful c1assificati'On 'Of intellectual productsdesigned t'O help apply the desert arguments,' (F'Or' example,
'i1¥~':!::'.> w.hat s'Orts 'Of products c'Onelatebest with certain s'Orts 'Of proprightsfPresumably a painter wh'O sells her canvases d'Oes
'!l'Ot need t'O p'Ossess 'Or use 'Or manage them, D'Oes she need c'Ontrol 'Over h'Ow the canvases are frl\ll1ed? Whether they are
.. "cropped" 'Or destr'Oyed? Does she need royalties fi'Om future
sales?)
(6) We need a careful analysis 'Of h'Ow vari'Ous pr'Oducts are t'O
be defined-in terms 'Of h'Ow fine 'Or h'Ow c'Oarse a structure is t'O
be used,
These issues I happily leave t'O an'Other time-or better still, t'O
gi~(?uss:i'On S'O far:

'n''''''', abler minds"

.

46, I gather that copyright _law technically satisfies the non-preclusion principle in the sense
thatit recognizes (as a defense to the charge of copy.ight infIingement) the possibility of genuinely
independent creations It is, however, difficult ,to succeed with that defense, especially give.n the 50called doctIine of unconscious cOpying" See' Bright Tunes Music Corp,: 'It Hauisongs Music, l.td...
420 F., Supp, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd sub nom, ABKCO Music, Inc v. Ha.risongs Music, Ltd,
722 F..2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983). (My thanks to Wendy Gordon fo. this point) Poor Pi,,,,'e Menard's
project, ,supra note 20, is thus legally doomed"

